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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3245 
 ___________ 
 
 JOHNNIEMAE GREEN; NORMAN GREEN 
 
 v. 
 
POSTMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES (Eastern Area); BRIAN 
STEWART, Individually and in his capacity as Plant Manager of the Philadelphia 
Logistics and Distribution Center for the U.S. Postal Service (Eastern Area) 
  Johnniemae Green, Appellant 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 08-0597) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 13, 2011 
Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 Opinion filed   July 18, 2011                                                                            
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
  Pro se appellant Johnniemae Green appeals the District Court’s orders 
granting defendant John E. Potter’s motion for partial dismissal and motion for summary 
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judgment.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise a plenary standard 
of review.  See Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 
2009); State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 
2009).  For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
  Green, an African-American woman, is a longtime employee of the United 
States Postal Service.  In December 2005, a Postal Service directive required Brian 
Stewart, the acting plant manager, to restructure the staffing at Green’s facility.  As 
relevant to Green, four management-level positions — managers of distribution 
operations, or “MDOs” — would be available, and all current managers (including 
Green) would be required to apply for these positions.  The most-coveted position was 
the “Lead MDO.” 
  Green applied for all four positions, and was selected for one that she later 
described as her third choice.  The Lead MDO went to Thomas Bissell, a white male.  
After obtaining a right-to-sue letter from the Postal Service’s Equal Employment 
Opportunity (EEO) Office, Green instituted this action against Potter, the Postmaster 
General, claiming that she had been discriminated against on account of her race and 
gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.  She 
also claimed that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment.
1
   
                                                 
1
 Green initially also included her husband as a plaintiff and the Postal Service and Brian 
Stewart as defendants, but she voluntarily dismissed those parties from the action.  She 
also voluntarily dismissed claims that she had raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.  Finally, 
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  After Green filed her complaint in the District Court, the Postal Service 
informed her that she would be transferred to another facility.  According to the Postal 
Service, the transfer was necessary because the proximity of Green and her daughter, 
who worked in the same facility, created a “problematic arrangement.”  Green then 
amended her complaint to allege that this transfer was the result of race and gender 
discrimination.   
  The District Court granted Potter’s motion to dismiss Green’s claims 
concerning her transfer, and subsequently granted summary judgment to Potter on the 
remaining claims.  Green then filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. 
  In her appellate brief, Green has not meaningfully challenged the District 
Court’s analysis or conclusions.  On our own independent review, we are satisfied that 
the Court did not err in granting judgment to Potter.  First, we agree that Potter was 
entitled to summary judgment on Green’s failure-to-promote claims.  Because Green did 
not provide direct evidence of discrimination, her claims are analyzed under the burden-
shifting framework set forth by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-
05 (1973).  See Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 318-19 (3d Cir. 
2000).  The parties agree that Green made a prima facie showing of discrimination 
                                                                                                                                                             
she included some allegations in her complaint concerning age discrimination, but did not 
develop those contentions before the District Court.  Insofar as Green sought to present 
an age-discrimination claim, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment to Potter on that claim.   
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because Bissell, a white male, was selected for the Lead MDO position that Green 
sought.  The burden thus shifts to Potter to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the employee’s rejection.”  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Potter has carried this burden.  Stewart, who was 
responsible for filling the Lead MDO position, explained that he selected Bissell for the 
position because he vastly outperformed Green during the interview stage of the hiring 
process.  In the interview, Stewart asked 25 questions that he believed the candidates 
should have been able to answer based on their experience at the Postal Service facility.  
Bissell answered 24 of those questions correctly; Green was able to provide correct 
answers to only 12.  See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 526 
(3d Cir. 1992).  
  The burden thus shifts back to Green to present sufficient evidence for a 
reasonable factfinder to disbelieve this explanation.  Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764.  Green 
argued that Stewart’s explanations were inconsistent — sometimes Stewart said he 
considered the candidates’ interview performance and their experience, and other times 
he focused only on the former.  Viewed in context, however, Stewart’s accounts are 
entirely consistent:  he said that he considered both factors in evaluating the candidates, 
and that in comparing Green and Bissell, it was the interview that made the difference.  
Green’s only other argument is that Stewart intentionally designed the interview to 
include questions that she could not answer.  This contention, however, is based solely on 
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Green’s own speculation and thus cannot sustain her burden.  See, e.g., Ridgewood Bd. 
of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999).
2
 
  We also agree with the District Court that Green failed to exhaust her 
claims that she was transferred due to the Postal Service’s racial or gender animus.  To 
exhaust the claims under Title VII, Green was required to contact an EEO counselor 
within 45 days of the alleged discriminatory action, see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1), and 
then file a formal complaint within 15 days of receiving notice of her right to file a 
complaint, see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(b).  Green was notified of the transfer on June 11, 
2007.  On June 20, 2007, she filed a pre-complaint form with the EEO challenging the 
transfer, but then did not file a formal complaint.  On September 4, 2007, she filed 
another pre-complaint form, and ultimately did file a formal complaint, but this complaint 
was untimely.  Green thus failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, which is 
typically fatal to a civil claim.  See Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1021 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
  Before the District Court, Green proffered two defenses.  First, she argued 
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  It is unclear whether Green intended to challenge Stewart’s selection of Theresa 
Bonhage, a white female, to fill another MDO position that Green sought.  As with her 
possible age-discrimination claim, she presented some stray allegations concerning 
Bonhage in her complaint, but did not develop any such claim before the District Court.  
To the extent that she did attempt to argue that the Postal Service’s choice of Bonhage 
was motivated by race discrimination, her claim fails for the same reason discussed above 
— that is, Stewart said that he picked Bonhage because she performed better than Green 
during their interviews, and Green has presented no basis for a reasonable juror to 
disbelieve that explanation.   
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that her claims concerning her transfer were within the scope of the (fully adequate) EEO 
complaint that she had previously filed concerning her failure-to-promote claims.  While 
we have recognized that a complainant need not file a new EEO complaint as to “new 
acts that occur during the pendency of the case which are fairly within the scope of an 
[EEO] complaint or the investigation growing out of that complaint,” Waiters v. Parsons, 
729 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1984), the transfer does not qualify under this rule because it 
was a discrete act that occurred after Green had received her right-to-sue letter from the 
EEO on her earlier claim, see Parisi v. Boeing Co., 400 F.3d 583, 586 (8th Cir. 2005).  
Second, Green claimed that she was entitled to equitable tolling because during the 
period for initiating an action with the EEO, she was severely depressed.  Equitable 
tolling is available in Title VII cases.  See Zipes v. TWA, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982).  
However, Green is not entitled to tolling here.  In another context, we have explained that 
for tolling to be appropriate, “the alleged mental incompetence must somehow have 
affected the petitioner’s ability to file” a timely action.  Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 320 
(3d Cir. 2001).  As noted above, Green was able to file a pre-complaint form on June 20, 
2007, and again on September 4, 2007, and pursued the latter complaint to completion; 
she has presented no evidence that suggests that her impairment drastically worsened 
after June 20 and then meaningfully improved by September 4.  Thus, she has failed to 
present evidence that her condition prevented her from filing a timely administrative 
complaint. 
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  Green also failed to exhaust her hostile-work-environment claim.  In her 
EEO complaint, she raised only a failure-to-promote claim, which does not encompass 
her separate claim of hostile work environment.  See Dorsey v. Pinnacle Automation Co., 
278 F.3d 830, 838-39 (8th Cir. 2002).  She thus did not adequately put the EEO “on 
notice” that she was attempting to raise this claim.  Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1296 
(3d Cir. 1996).    
  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s orders dismissing Green’s 
amended complaint in part and granting summary judgment to Potter.    
